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作者
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內容
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edward
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Posted -
2003/5/29 下午 12:30:46
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中文版：
聖座教育部所核准之聖多瑪斯派哲學論題
英文版：
The Twenty-Four Fundamental Theses Of Official Catholic Philosophy
Part I
Part II
拉丁文：
Theses approbatae philosophiae thomisticae
1. Potentia et actus ita dividunt ens, ut quidquid est, vel sit actus purus, vel ex potentia et actu tamquam primis atque intrinsecis principiis necessario coalescat.
2. Actus, utpote perfectio, non limitatur nisi per potentiam, quae est capacitas perfectionis. Proinde in quo ordine actus est purus, in eodem nonnisi illimitatus et unicus exsistit; ubi vero est finitus ac multiplex, in veram incidit cum potentia compositionem.
3. Quapropter in absoluta ipsius esse ratione unus subsistit Deus, unus est simplicissimus, cetera cuncta quae ipsum esse participant, naturam habent qua esse coarctatur, ac tamquam distinctis realiter principiis, essentia et esse constant.
4. Ens quod denominatur ab esse, non univoce de Deo ac de creaturis dicitur, nec tamen prorsus aequivoce, sed analogice, analogia tum attributionis tum proportionalitatis.
5. Est praeterea in omni creatura realis compositio subiecti subsistentis cum formis secundario additis, sive accidentibus: ea vero, nisi esse realiter in essentia distincta reciperetur, intellegi non posset.
6. Praeter absoluta accidentia est etiam relativum, sive ad aliquid. Quamvis enim ad aliquid non significet secundum propriam rationem aliquid alicui inhaerens, saepe tamen causam in rebus habet, et ideo realem entitatem distinctam a subiecto.
7. Creatura spiritualis est in sua essentia omnino simplex. Sed remanet in ea compositio duplex: essentiae cum esse et substantiae cum accidentibus.
8. Creatura vero corporalis est quoad ipsam essentiam composita potentia et actu; quae potentia et actus ordinis essentiae, materiae et formae nominibus designantur.
9. Earum partium neutra per se esse habet, nec per se producitur vel corrumpitur, nec ponitur in praedicamento nisi reductive ut principium substantiale.
10. Etsi corpoream naturam extensio in partes integrales consequitur, non tamen idem est corpori esse substantiam et esse quantum. Substantia quippe ratione sui indivisibilis est, non quidem ad modum puncti, sed ad modum eius quod est extra ordinem dimensionis. Quantitas vero, quae extensionem substantiae tribuit, a substantia realiter differt, et est veri nominis accidens.
11. Quantitate signata materia principium est individuationis, id est numericae distinctionis, quae in puris spiritibus esse non potest, unius individui ab alio in eadem natura specifica.
12. Eadem efficitur quantitate, ut corpus circumscriptive sit in loco, et in uno tantum loco de quacumque potentia per hunc modum esse possit.
13. Corpora dividuntur bifariam: quaedam enim sunt viventia, quaedam expertia vitae. In viventibus, ut in eodem subiecto pars movens et pars mota per se habeantur, forma substantialis, animae nomine designata, requirit organicam dispositionem seu partes heterogeneas.
14. Vegetalis et sensilis ordinis animae nequaquam per se subsistunt, nec per se producuntur, sed sunt tantummodo ut principium quo vivens est et vivit, et cum a materia se totis dependeant, corruptio composito, eo ipso per accidens corrumpuntur.
15. Contra, per se subsistit anima humana, quae, cum subiecto sufficienter dispositio potest infundi, a Deo creatur, et sua natura incorruptibilis est atque immortalis.
16. Eadem anima rationalis ita unitur corpori, ut sit eiusdem forma substantialis unica, et per ipsam habet homo ut sit homo et animal et vivens et copus et substantia et ens. Tribuit igitur anima homini omnem gradum perfectionis essentialem; insuper communicat corpori actum essendi, quo ipsa est.
17. Duplicis ordinis facultates, organicae et inorganicae, ex anima humana per naturalem resultantiam emanant: priores, ad quas sensus pertinet, in composito subiectantur, posteriores in anima sola. Est igitur intellectus facultas ab organo intrinsece independens.
18. Immaterialitatem necessario sequitur intellectualitas, et ita quidem, ut secundum gradus elongationis a materia sint quoque gradus intellectualitatis. Adaequatum intellectionis obiectum est communiter ipsum ens; proprium vero intellectus humani in praesenti statu unionis, quidditatibus abstractis a condicionibus materialibus continetur.
19. Cognitionem ergo accipimus a rebus sensibilibus. Cum autem sensibile non sit intelligibile in actu, praeter intellectum formaliter intelligentem admittenda est in anima virtus activa, quae species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus abstrahat.
20. Per has species directe universalia cognoscimus; singularia sensu attingimus, tum etiam intellectu per conversionem ad phantasmata; ad cognitionem vero spiritualium per analogiam ascendimus.
21. Intellectum sequitur, non praecedit, voluntas, quae necessario appetit id quod sibi praesentatur tamquam bonum ex omni parte explens appetitum, sed inter plura bona, quae iudicio mutabili appetenda proponuntur, libere eligit. Sequitur proinde electio iudicium practicum ultimum; at quod sit ultimum, voluntas efficit.
22. Deum esse neque immediata intuitione percipimus, neque a priori demonstramus, sed utique a posteriori, hoc est, "per ea quae facta sunt" (Rm 1, 20), ducto argumento ab effectibus ad causam: videlicet, a rebus quae moventur et sui motus principium adaequatum esse non possunt, ad primum moterm immobilem; a processu rerum mundanarum e causis inter se subordinatis ad primam causam incausatam; a corruptilibus quae aequaliter se habent ad esse et non esse, ad ens absolute necessarium; ab iis quae secundum minoratas perfectiones essendi, vivendi, intelligendi, plus et minus sunt, vivunt, intelligunt, ad eum qui est maxime intelligens, maxime vivens, maxime ens; denique, ab ordine universi ad intellectum separatum, qui res ordinavit, disposuit, et dirigit ad finem.
23. Divina essentia, per hoc quod exercitae actualitati ipsius esse identificatur, seu per hoc quod est ipsum Esse subsistens, in sua veluti metaphysica ratione bene nobis constituta proponitur, et per hoc idem rationem nobis exhibet suae infinitatis in perfectione.
24. Ipsa igitur puritate sui esse, a finitis omnibus rebus secernitur Deus. Inde infertur primo, mundum nonnisi per creationem a Deo procedere potuisse; deinde virtutem creativam, qua per se primo attingitur ens in quantum ens, nec miraculose ulli finitae naturae esse communicabilem; nullum denique creatum agens in esse cuiuscumque effectus influere, nisi motione accepta a prima Causa.
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靚仔
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Posted -
2003/5/29 下午 01:18:49
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哈哈,潛能與實現,存在與本質,形與質......
剛剛考完...希望碌過...哈哈.
不過小心,聖多瑪斯只是教會推崇的一種哲學體系,而非"絕對真理"或"絕對哲學",哲學只是盛載神學的一項工具.教會只在兩個範疇有其"絕對"的權威,即信仰和倫理的範疇.不過話又說回來,不讀經院哲學,你是很難明白士林神學家們真正在說甚麼.
又即沒讀康德和海德格,你也未必能明白為何拉內會如此表達我們的信仰.
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edward
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Posted -
2003/5/29 下午 03:24:44
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哈哈，一向都很想了解清楚這些重要概念背後的意義。對我來說，「Hylemorphism」和「Materia signata quantitate」，都是極為困難的觀念。若有一天能夠參透的話，真有「朝聞道夕死可矣」之感。
存在主義是近來很常聽到的名詞。但就如先前所討論過康德的「先驗範疇」，對一般的平信徒而言都是十分難以明白的觀念。我們是否能從信仰的角度，去分析兩者？
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靚仔
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Posted -
2003/5/29 下午 04:24:22
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哲學所探討的問題和神學很多時都重複,但進路不同,康德的先驗範疇可以說是純哲學的探討,如何從信仰的角度去探討?
但神學卻可借用當代的哲學去回答當代人的信仰問題.
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edward
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Posted -
2003/5/30 上午 12:35:35
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當代人的「信仰」問題，可如何藉神學對當代哲學的借用而作出回答？所借用的哲學，是用於發掘問題，抑或是用於解答問題？
若是用於發掘問題，那麼這些問題算是信仰問題抑或哲學問題？
若是用於解答問題，那麼被解答的問題算是信仰問題抑或哲學問題？
又可不可以說：當代人的信仰問題，其實往往是有著若干的哲學幅度？然而，其他的學科，如心理學、經濟學和醫學，又可否被借用來回答人們的信仰問題呢？
「純哲學的探討」得出的結論，是否就完全沒有可能與我們信仰的內容產生衝突呢？若人不能對身外的世界及事物的本質達至客觀和真實的知識──因而不可能由世間的受造物而追尋出造物主的客觀存在──那麼，這是否會與信仰的內容產生衝突呢？
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Augustine
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Posted -
2003/5/30 下午 01:12:45
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"(當代人的)「純哲學的探討」得出的結論，是否就完全沒有可能與我們信仰的內容產生衝突呢？"
I recommend the book: Trojan Horse in the City of God by Dietrich Von Hildebrand 1967 Fransciscan Herald.
In Chapter 6 (On Christian Revelation and philosophy), he says:
" The Christian and Judiaic Faith in essence rejects any form of relativism, ideological relativism, metaphysical or moral relativism, or any materialism, immanenism, determinism(whatever form it is), not to mention aetheism."
Of course one needs to spend some efforts into the teaching of those list of philosophical schools.
The reason the Church prefers Thomism is that, as von Hildebrand says, "the Church prefers a closed system like Thomism, part of the intention is because it could prevent the danger of heresy
. Older philosophies of St. Anselm or Bonaventura, following the tradition if St. Augustine, are equally suitable for explaining revealed truths, but they are not closed.
Although this openness, from the standpoint of pure philosophical interest
, is a critical advantage. But it could be dangerous to teach and accept these kinds of philosophy."
(One has only to look at Wycliff, Luther or Calvin who misunderstood the great doctor of Hippo)
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Augustine
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Posted -
2003/5/30 下午 01:17:08
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G. K. Chesterton, in his book,
Saint Thomas Aquinas-"the Dumb ox" made a vivid image of the philosophical system of St. Thomas as the "giant in his clumsiness defending the Faith"
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edward
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Posted -
2003/5/30 下午 01:21:15
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為甚麼說聖多瑪期的系統是「封閉」，而聖奧斯定的就是「開放」呢？
彼此之間，有何特徵上的差異呢，以致對啟示或信德造成危機呢？
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靚仔
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Posted -
2003/5/30 下午 03:22:05
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我想起瑪西方哲學來來去去都是探討那"一堆"問題,所以我不覺得他們在"發拙"甚麼新問題,但又可說這些問題是萬古常新的.
神學和哲學可以一同探討同一個問題如"真理",哲學只可以運用人的理性去解答,而神學除理性外卻可以運用啟示去解答.而在去解釋我們整個團體的信仰經驗時,我們又可以運用所有已知的學科去幫助我們解答.
所以你說我在探討禮儀時是否可以運用社會人類學?但當我運用一些社會人類學的理論時,又是否意味我的答案不是禮儀神學?
augustine, 對於你對多馬斯及奧氏的看法不敢苟同.
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edward
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Posted -
2003/5/30 下午 03:42:02
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「Danger of heresy」，聖多瑪斯的神哲學系統，曾幾何時也令他認為聖母是有原罪的。若因噎癈食，就太不值得了。
當然，你可以說信德極端珍貴，不容有失，所以最好還是對神學哲學「敬而遠之」。
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Augustine
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Posted -
2003/5/30 下午 03:59:55
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No I was just suggesting the explanation by Prof. Hildebrand. I have not have a thorough training in scholastic theology yet. Therefore it is not for me to write any critique on both doctors' methods.
But the reason I reflect about different systems is that I must choose before I spend time on it. You see each of these(Thomism and Augustinianism) are both treasured in the Church, and it's a hard choice(if I have time I would start with Augustine but Thomism clearly is more useful).
The "closed system": Hildebrand didn't clarify the term in his book. But it need not be perceived negatively as exclusiveness to other systems(which it clearly isn't). Somehow people fear this word.
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Augustine
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Posted -
2003/5/30 下午 04:08:53
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"你對多馬斯及奧氏的看法不敢苟同"
My opinion on them is merely: marvel and reverent...period.
I really don't know what the problem is concerning the effectiveness of St. Thomas as the defender of orthodoxy against heresy. The example of misguided Augustinianism plays its part in CHurch History so that makes me somewhat suspicious of it.
Because Thomism has been so useful, I admire it. And the St.Augustine, being less organized and stringent in language, is (and history shows this) more easily subjected to poor interpretations.
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